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ABSTRACT
Financial economists have long been puzzled by investor demand for actively managed funds that
generate, on average, negative after-fee, risk-adjusted returns. To shed new light on this puzzle, we
exploit the fact that funds in different market segments compete for different types of retail investors.
Within the segment of funds marketed directly to retail investors, we find that flows chase risk-adjusted
returns, and that funds respond by investing more in active management.  Importantly, within this
direct-sold segment, we find little evidence that actively managed funds underperform index funds.
In contrast, within the segment of funds sold through brokers, which we demonstrate face a weaker
incentive to generate alpha, we find that actively managed funds significantly underperform index
funds. We conclude that the well-known underperformance of the average actively managed fund
in the full sample is driven by the large fraction of funds with weak incentives to identify and motivate
skilled managers.
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  The typical actively managed U.S. equity fund earns a negative after-fee alpha (Gruber 
(1996), French (2008), Fama and French (2010), and others).  This well-documented underper-
formance gives rise to two important and related questions.  Why do actively managed funds un-
derperform?  And, given this underperformance, why are the vast majority of mutual fund assets 
still invested in actively managed funds?  The widely-accepted answer to the first question is that 
efficient U.S. equity markets make it difficult for U.S. mutual fund managers to add value net of 
fees.  The answer to the second question has been debated since Gruber (1996) first highlighted 
this puzzle in his AFA presidential address and suggested that it might be driven by ‘disadvan-
taged’ investors who are either ignorant of the underperformance or behaving irrationally. 
  Rationalizing retail investor demand for active management is an area of active research.  
Most recent papers take the approach that traditional tests for positive after-fee alphas are the 
wrong benchmark for actively managed funds.
1  Glode (2011) and Savov (2012) argue that it is 
rational for investors to accept negative average alphas if active funds outperform in periods 
when marginal utility is high.  However, de Souza and Lynch (2012) find little evidence that mu-
tual fund returns are countercyclical.  Berk and van Binsbergen (2012) argue that actively man-
aged funds should be benchmarked against the set of investable index mutual funds available to 
retail investors instead of against an after-fee alpha of zero.  Their argument is strengthened by 
findings in Elton, Gruber, Das, and Hlavka (1993) and Cremers, Petajisto, and Zitzewitz (2012) 
that factor models can generate significant non-zero alphas when applied to purely passive indi-
ces.  Nevertheless, Berk and van Binsbergen (2012) find that the average actively managed fund 
underperforms, leading them to the familiar conclusion that at least some retail investors are be-
                                                           
1 There are also two explanations based on investor learning.  Baks, Metrick, and Watcher (2001) show in a Bayesi-
an framework that even investors that have skeptical priors over the existence of manager skill will optimally invest 
in actively managed funds if the maximum posterior after-fee alpha is positive.  Pastor and Stambaugh (2012) show 
that investment in active funds is rational when investors simultaneously learn about manager skill and about the 
extent to which decreasing returns to scale affects the performance of actively managed funds.   2 
having irrationally.  Notably, each of these papers implicitly assumes that retail investor prefer-
ences are homogeneous. 
  In this paper, we propose and test a different explanation for the underperformance of 
actively managed funds, one based on heterogeneity in investor preferences.  Motivated by the 
recent findings in Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) and Christoffersen, Evans, and 
Musto (2012), we hypothesize that retail mutual funds sold through intermediaries, or brokers, 
face a weaker incentive to generate alpha than mutual funds sold directly to retail investors, and 
that this disincentive helps to explain the underperformance of the average actively managed 
fund.  Our explanation rests on the premise that mutual fund families will expend resources to 
generate alpha only to the extent that they expect the investments to increase investor flows.  The 
lower the expected benefit associated with investing in active management—because, for exam-
ple, investor flows are less responsive to alpha—the weaker the incentive to do so.   
Evidence on the pricing and product characteristics of mutual funds sold through brokers 
versus those sold directly to investors supports our hypothesis that they serve investor clienteles 
with distinct preferences.  Retail funds sold directly to investors offer unbundled access to port-
folio management.  Their investors neither receive, nor pay extra fees for, advice.  In contrast, 
retail  funds  sold  through  brokers  bundle  portfolio  management  with  financial  advice.    Del 
Guercio, Reuter, and Tkac (2010) show that fund families tend to sell their funds either directly 
to investors or through brokers, but rarely do both, suggesting a segmented market where the na-
ture of competition differs across the two segments.  Because experienced and knowledgeable 
investors are likely to self-select into direct-sold funds, flows in this segment are more likely to 
respond to risk-adjusted returns, giving direct-sold families a strong incentive to generate alpha.  
In contrast, the findings in Christoffersen, Evans, and Musto (2012) and Chalmers and Reuter   3 
(2012) suggest that competition in the broker-sold segment is likely to focus on characteristics 
other than alpha, such as the level of broker compensation.  The weaker the sensitivity of inves-
tor flows to alpha, the weaker the incentive to generate alpha.  Indeed, we find strong evidence 
that the underperformance of the average actively managed fund can be explained by variation 
across market segments in the incentive that funds face to generate alpha.  
  We use data from Financial Research Corporation (FRC) to distinguish direct-sold retail 
mutual funds from broker-sold retail mutual funds.  We begin our analysis by testing whether 
flows in the direct-sold segment are more sensitive to risk-adjusted returns than flows in the bro-
ker-sold segment.  When we estimate regressions on the pooled sample of retail funds, we find 
the standard result that monthly flows respond to both raw and risk-adjusted performance (e.g., 
Gruber (1996), Sirri and Tufano (1998), and Del Guercio and Tkac (2002)).  However, when we 
allow flow-performance sensitivities to vary across segments, we find that only self-directed in-
vestors chase alpha.  We find no significant relation between flows into broker-sold funds and 
their alphas, but find instead a strong relation between flows and raw returns.  Thus, direct-sold 
funds face a stronger flow-induced incentive to generate alpha than broker-sold funds, but a 
weaker incentive to compete for investors by increasing beta. 
  Since we cannot observe the actual dollars that funds invest in generating alpha, we test 
for differences across direct-sold and broker-sold funds in measures associated with successful 
active management.  We use the return gap measure of Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008) to 
show that direct-sold funds create significantly more value through their “unobserved actions,” 
and the active share measure of Cremers and Petajisto (2009) to show that direct-sold funds are 
significantly less likely to be closet indexers.  We also find that direct-sold funds have lower es-
timated betas than comparable broker-sold funds.  Consistent with Bergstresser, Chalmers, and   4 
Tufano (2009), we find that direct-sold funds have significantly higher alphas than broker-sold 
funds, on the order of 115 basis points per year.  Because the pricing of small-cap equity may be 
less efficient than the pricing of large-cap equity, we test for and find that the differences in al-
pha, return gap, and beta are even larger when we focus on funds invested in small-cap equity.   
To strengthen the evidence that direct-sold families respond to the incentives derived 
from their performance-sensitive clientele, we use a variety of data sources to test for behaviors 
shown in the literature to have a robust positive impact on alpha.  For example, we find that fam-
ilies with direct-sold funds are significantly more likely to specialize in a narrower range of in-
vestment styles, less likely to outsource portfolio management to subadvisors, and more likely to 
hire portfolio managers from undergraduate institutions with higher average math SAT scores, 
than families with broker-sold funds.
2  Collectively, these findings suggest that direct-sold fami-
lies make operational decisions intended to help them generate the risk-adjusted performance 
that their target clientele demands. 
  Finally, we revisit the relative performance of actively managed funds and index funds.  
Consistent with the literature, in pooled regressions of all retail funds we find that actively man-
aged funds underperform index funds by 88 basis points per year, which is essentially the differ-
ence in expense ratios.  However, our findings are markedly different when we compare the per-
formance of actively managed funds and index funds available in the same market segment, and 
hence targeted at the same type of retail investor.  Within the direct-sold segment, we find that 
the after-fee alphas of actively managed funds are economically and statistically indistinguisha-
ble  from  those  of  index  funds—the  elusive  equilibrium  condition  in  Grossman  and  Stiglitz 
(1980) and Berk and Green (2004).  In contrast, within the broker-sold segment, actively man-
aged funds underperform index funds between 112 and 132 basis points per year.  These differ-
                                                           
2 We describe the literature that motivates these tests in sections III.B, C, and D.   5 
ences are robust to the inclusion of fund-level controls, and to sample restrictions based on fund 
age and ticker shown to eliminate incubation bias (Evans (2010)). Thus, the well-documented 
underperformance of the average actively managed fund is driven by the large number of under-
performing broker-sold funds.   
  Our findings provide new answers to the two research questions raised above.  Within the 
direct-sold segment, where the nature of competition better matches Berk and Green’s (2004) 
model, we find strong support for their prediction that actively managed funds earn the same ex-
pected after-fee alphas as index funds.  This highlights the need to consider incentives when 
evaluating mutual fund performance.  It also challenges the view that the relative efficiency of 
U.S. equity markets prevents actively managed equity funds from recovering their fees.  Instead, 
our findings are consistent with the view that the underperformance of the average actively man-
aged fund arises from the interaction between relatively efficient equity markets and relatively 
weak incentives to identify and incentivize skilled managers. 
  The fact that the persistent underperformance of actively managed funds is limited to 
broker-sold actively managed funds helps to rationalize the continuing demand for direct-sold 
actively managed funds.  At the same time, it challenges alternative explanations, like those in 
Glode (2012) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2012), to explain why underperformance is limited to 
the broker-sold segment.  The fact that the vast majority of the assets in the broker-sold segment 
are invested in underperforming actively managed funds is likely to reflect an agency conflict 
between brokers and their clients.  In other words, consistent with Gruber’s (1996) ‘disadvan-
taged investor’ hypothesis, the key to rationalizing investor demand for underperforming actively 
managed funds is rationalizing investor demand for brokers. 
  In Section I, we use differences in investor clienteles across retail market segments to ar-  6 
gue that broker-sold funds face a weaker incentive to generate alpha than direct-sold funds, and 
we summarize our data.  In Section II, we document across-segment differences in the sensitivity 
of fund flows to risk-adjusted, after-fee returns.  In Section III, we use a variety of performance 
metrics and additional data sources to document that direct-sold funds choose to invest more in 
active management.  In Section IV, we document across-segment differences in the relative per-
formance of actively managed and passively managed funds.  In Section V, we summarize our 
findings and discuss their implications for the puzzle of active management. 
I. Heterogeneity in Retail Investor Preferences and the Market for Retail Mutual Fund
  Most studies of retail mutual funds implicitly assume a homogeneous product market, 
where funds primarily compete on after-fee performance for homogeneous investors.  Yet, the 
fees that retail mutual funds charge (expense ratios, including 12b-1 fees, plus any sales loads) 
can be used to provide investors with two distinct bundles of services.  For example, investors 
who wish to buy one of the largest funds, the Investment Company of America fund offered by 
the American Funds family, can only do so through a financial advisor, as the fund is not sold 
directly to investors.  Because the fund is sold only as a packaged bundle of portfolio manage-
ment services and financial advice services, the fees that American Funds charges its investors 
are ultimately used to compensate both portfolio managers and financial advisers.  In contrast, 
the Vanguard Windsor fund is sold directly to investors through Vanguard’s website or through 
an intermediary, such as Charles Schwab.  The crucial distinction is that the fees the investor 
pays directly to Vanguard are for portfolio management services only.  If an investor wants to 
buy Vanguard mutual funds and receive advice on asset allocation or fund selection, he must pay 
separately for this advice.   
  More generally, retail mutual funds can be classified as providing either unbundled port-  7 
folio management services, or a packaged bundle of portfolio management and investment ad-
vice.  Not surprisingly, the two types of funds are targeted at different types of investors.  Ac-
cording to an Investment Company Institute (ICI) survey, 51% of mutual fund shareholders indi-
cate that they have an ongoing relationship with a financial adviser.  Of these investors, 98% in-
dicate that they have had contact with their financial adviser in the prior 12 months, and that they 
have been receiving investment advice from this adviser for a median of 10 years.  They report-
edly use an adviser because they “need help with asset allocation decisions” and “want a finan-
cial professional to explain various investment options” and because it “gives them peace of 
mind about their investments.”  These surveys suggest that investors who use advisers value the 
face-to-face contact and long-term relationship with an adviser.  In contrast, the 18% of investors 
who do not purchase mutual funds through a financial adviser state that they “want to be in con-
trol of own investments” and already “have access to resources needed to invest on my own.”
3   
  Chalmers and Reuter (2012) find similar evidence of investor heterogeneity when they 
study demand for full-service brokers within a defined contribution plan.  Plan participants who 
choose to invest through a broker are younger, less highly educated, and less highly paid than 
self-directed investors, suggesting that they are less experienced investors.  In addition, surveyed 
participants who choose to invest through a broker are more likely to rank access to face-to-face 
meetings as important or very important (70% versus 39%), more likely to state that they relied 
on the recommendation of a broker in determining their equity allocation (74% versus 45%), and 
less likely to state that they feel comfortable making changes to their allocation without consult-
ing their broker (25% versus 44%).  
                                                           
3 These surveys are from “Ownership of Mutual Funds, Shareholder Sentiment, and Use of the Internet, 2010” In-
vestment Company Institute’s Research Fundamentals September 2010 page 14 and “Why Do Mutual Fund Inves-
tors Use Professional Financial Advisers? Investment Company Institute’s Research Fundamentals April 2007 pag-
es 5 and 6.   8 
  Differences in investor preferences and experience across the direct-sold and broker-sold 
market segments have important implications for the nature of competition within each segment.  
Specifically,  we  expect  competition  in  the  broker-sold  segment  to  focus  much  less  on  risk-
adjusted returns, thereby reducing the incentive for broker-sold funds to expend resources to 
generate alpha.  First, because broker-sold funds provide two distinct types of services, broker 
clients may rationally accept lower expected returns in exchange for the broker services they 
perceive as higher quality, such as the personal trust that comes from repeated face-to-face con-
tact (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012)).  Second, to the extent that broker clients are less 
experienced investors, they may be less likely to appreciate the difference between raw and risk-
adjusted returns.
4  Finally, payments to brokers have been repeatedly shown to provide powerful 
incentives, suggesting that broker-sold funds can effectively compete for flows by paying higher 
fees  to  brokers  rather  than  making  greater  investments  in  active  management  (Bergstresser, 
Chalmers, and Tufano (2009), Christoffersen, Evans, and Musto (2012), Chalmers and Reuter 
(2012), and Anagol, Cole, and Sarkar (2012)).  For these reasons, we begin our empirical analy-
sis by testing whether investor flows in the broker-sold segment are less sensitive to alpha than 
investor flows in the direct-sold segment.  
A.  Data on Distribution Channel 
  We use data from Financial Research Corporation (FRC) to distinguish direct-sold retail 
mutual funds from broker-sold retail mutual funds.
5  These data cover 1992-2004, and were first 
                                                           
4 Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny’s (2012) theoretical prediction that brokers will pander to investor biases finds 
empirical support in studies of fund flows by Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) and Chalmers and Reuter 
(2012), and in audit studies by Anagol, Cole, and Sarkar (2012) and Mullainathan, Nöth, and Schoar (2012). 
5 Although FRC provides information on whether a fund is sold through a captive salesforce that exclusively sells a 
single family’s funds, or through a wholesale salesforce that sells the funds of multiple families, we follow BCT and 
combine both captive and wholesale salesforces into one broker-sold category.  We are implicitly assuming that the 
advice services offered by wholesale brokers are not materially different from the advice services of captive brokers.  
See Christoffersen, Evans, and Musto (2012) for a detailed analysis of captive versus wholesale salesforce fund dis-
tribution, including the compensation arrangements between fund families and their salesforces.   9 
analyzed by Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009).
6  Although FRC distinguishes institu-
tional funds from retail funds, we choose to exclude institutional funds from our analysis.  While 
FRC data do allow us to cleanly identify retail funds targeted at different types of retail investors, 
they do not allow us to identify institutional funds targeted at different types of institutional in-
vestors.
7  (For completeness, we re-estimate our main tests on the sample including direct-sold, 
broker-sold, and institutional funds and report the results in the appendix.) 
  We obtain data on total net assets (TNA), monthly returns, annual expenses, and other 
fund characteristics from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund Database.  We merge the 
FRC and CRSP data at the share class level.  When aggregating distribution (and other character-
istics) to the fund level, we weight each share class in proportion to its TNA in the prior month.  
We classify a fund as being direct-sold or broker-sold when at least 75% of its assets are sold 
through share classes focused on that segment.  Collectively, these funds manage 82.9% of the 
assets invested in nonspecialized domestic equity.  Of the remaining assets, 8.4% are invested in 
institutional funds, and 8.7% are invested in funds that FRC does not classify. 
  We identify nonspecialized domestic equity funds as those for which the  Standard & 
Poor’s investment objective in CRSP is listed as aggressive growth (AGG), mid-cap growth 
(GMC),  growth and income (GRI),  growth (GRO),  income  and  growth (ING),  or small-cap 
growth (SCG).  For 1996-2002, we also possess data on Morningstar investment objectives, 
which capture variation in market capitalization and style (e.g., small-cap value versus large-cap 
growth).  Because Morningstar investment objectives better capture differences in how funds 
                                                           
6 We refer interested readers to their paper for both a detailed description of the FRC data and an overview of mutual 
fund distribution. As an independent check of this data, we were able to obtain distribution codes from the Invest-
ment Company Institute (ICI) for 2002. We find that only 3.4% of funds that FRC classifies as direct-sold are classi-
fied by ICI as broker-sold (or vice-versa). We thank Brian Reid for providing this data. 
7 See James and Karceski (2006) for a comprehensive analysis of mutual funds that cater to institutional investors. 
Using fund prospectuses, they document substantial heterogeneity in the types of accounts within institutional funds 
(and share classes), such as 401(k) plan participants, foundations and endowments, customers of a bank trust or cus-
todial account, or investors with more than $100,000 to invest in the fund.   10 
invest, we use them to measure family-level investment style specialization. 
B.  Summary Statistics 
  In Table 1 Panel A, we provide evidence on the relative sizes of the direct-sold and bro-
ker-sold market segments.  Total assets under management in the domestic equity mutual funds 
increase from $311.2 billion in 1992 to $1,967.8 billion in 2004.  During this period, the market 
share of direct-sold funds increases from 52.2% to 59.7%.  The market share of index funds in-
creases from 2.8% to 10.4%.  Notably, the increased demand for index funds is driven by the di-
rect-sold segment.  Within the broker-sold segment, the fraction of assets invested in index funds 
remains below 2.0%. 
  We also provide evidence that the typical mutual fund family serves a single segment of 
the retail market.  Following Del Guercio, Reuter, and Tkac (2010), we aggregate from the share 
class level and calculate the fraction of assets that each family distributes through the direct-sold 
and broker-sold segments.  We then classify a family as being direct-sold, for example, if it dis-
tributes the largest fraction of assets through the direct-sold segment.  Between 1992 and 2004, 
the average fraction of assets that direct-sold families sell through the direct-sold segment de-
clines slightly from 98.1% to 96.5%.  The decline in the fraction of assets distributed through the 
broker-sold segment is larger for broker-sold families (99.7% to 92.2%), but still modest.
8  (In 
both segments, the median fraction distributed through the primary distribution segment remains 
constant at 100%.)  The fact that many mutual fund families focus on either the direct-sold seg-
ment or the broker-sold segment reinforces the idea that families need to invest in different bun-
dles of services to compete for different types of investors.
9 
                                                           
8 The fraction of families that distribute any assets in both segments ranges from 1.3% in 1992 to 7.4% in 2004. 
9 Del Guercio, Reuter, and Tkac (2010) document that a family’s primary distribution segment is highly persistent. 
Only three families switch their primary distribution segment during our sample period. We analyze the funds be-
longing to these families in sections III.A and III.B.   11 
  We report fund-level summary statistics in Table 1 Panel B.  The unit of observation 
when calculating means and standard deviations is fund i in month t.  We note several interesting 
differences across the two market segments.  While there are significantly more actively man-
aged funds available in the broker-sold segment (615.7 versus 440.2), the average broker-sold 
fund manages significantly fewer assets ($840 million versus $1.4 billion).  Broker-sold funds 
also have significantly lower portfolio turnover, a difference that may reflect less active man-
agement, more volatile investor flows, or both. 
The difference in average expense ratios of direct-sold and broker-sold actively managed 
funds (1.29 versus 1.57) is essentially equal to the difference in average 12b-1 fees (0.09 versus 
0.40), which are the fees that the SEC allows funds to charge for distribution.  However, funds in 
the two segments are unlikely to invest the same proportion of their non-12b-1 fees in active 
management because broker-sold funds commonly use management fees to pay for distribu-
tion.
10  Consequently, it is not possible to measure what funds pay for inputs like skilled manag-
ers, analysts, and trading desks using the fee categories that the SEC requires funds to disclose.  
For this reason, we need to rely on alternative measures to test for differential investments in ac-
tive management.  
Panel B also shows that broker-sold index funds are more expensive than direct-sold in-
dex funds.  This is sensible because broker-sold index funds need to compensate brokers for 
providing  financial  advice.  In  other  words,  some  of  the  price  dispersion  studied  by  Elton, 
Gruber, and Busse (2004) and Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) is driven by the different bundles 
of investor services provided in the different market segments.  
                                                           
10 Although mutual fund investors pay more than $10 billion annually in 12b-1 fees, it is widely recognized that 
12b-1 fees underestimate the total cost of marketing and distribution.  For example, it is common for mutual fund 
families to use management fees to cover distribution costs in a practice known as revenue-sharing (see, for exam-
ple, footnote 13 in Elton, Gruber, and Busse (2004), footnote 8 in Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009), Zweig 
(2009), Pozen and Hamacher (2011) page 259, and the SEC roundtable on 12b-1 fees dated June 19, 2007).   12 
  When we focus on average monthly after-fee returns, we see that direct-sold actively 
managed funds appear to outperform broker-sold actively managed funds (92 basis points versus 
80 basis points).  On an annualized basis, the difference is 144 basis points, which is much big-
ger than the 31 basis point difference in 12b-1 fees.  The fact that broker-sold funds underper-
form by more than the difference in 12b-1 fees is the key finding in Bergstresser, Chalmers, and 
Tufano (2009).  Interestingly, direct-sold actively managed funds also appear to outperform all 
other categories, including the index funds in both segments.  However, unlike the return regres-
sions that we estimate later, these averages do not control for differences in risk exposure or dif-
ferences in the returns earned across asset classes and time. 
II. Flow-Performance in the Direct-Sold Segment Creates the Strongest Incentive to Gen-
erate Alpha 
  Because mutual fund fee revenues increase with assets under management, mutual funds 
have a strong incentive to provide the services that attract new investor dollars.  Above, we hy-
pothesized that competition in the broker-sold segment is less focused on risk-adjusted returns, 
reducing the incentive for broker-sold funds to generate alpha.  Here, we test for differences in 
the flow-performance relation across the direct-sold and broker-sold segments using data on ac-
tively managed domestic equity funds that covers January 1993 to December 2004.
11  Table 2 
contains the regression results.  The dependent variable is the monthly net percentage flow of 
fund i in month t.  Focusing on monthly flows allows us to test for across-segment differences in 
investor sensitivity to short-term performance.  In Panel A, we test for differential sensitivity to 
raw versus risk-adjusted performance measures.  In Panel B, we allow for non-linearities in the 
                                                           
11 We omit a review of the large literature on the fund flow-performance relation.  However, papers that have specif-
ically focused on the flow-performance relation within or across particular clienteles in the United States include 
Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) (direct vs. broker-sold), Christoffersen, Evans, and Musto (2011) (cap-
tive broker vs. wholesale broker), James and Karceski (2006) (institutional and bank-sponsored), Chen, Yao, and Yu 
(2007) (insurance), and Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) (separate account).    13 
sensitivity of flows to raw returns.  The independent variables of interest are fund i’s monthly net 
return in month t-1, fund i’s monthly 4-factor alpha in t-1, and dummy variables that indicate 
whether fund i’s net return in month t-1 was in the top 20% or the bottom 20% of funds with the 
same CRSP investment objective.  We estimate fund i's four-factor alpha in month t using its af-
ter-fee monthly returns over the prior 24 months and the factors available for download on Ken 
French’s website.
12  We also include fund i’s monthly net flow in month t-1 to capture the effect 
of longer-term performance.  Other fund-level control variables include a dummy variable indi-
cating whether fund i charges a sales load, fund i’s lagged expense ratio and 12b-1 fee, the natu-
ral logarithm of fund i’s TNA, the natural logarithm of its family’s TNA, and fund i’s age.   
  Table 2 column (1) reports the results of a pooled regression relating net flows in month t 
to performance in month t-1.  This regression ignores the fact that different retail mutual funds 
are targeted at different types of retail investors, but it includes month-objective fixed effects to 
control for monthly shocks to aggregate demand within each investment objective, each month.  
Table 2 columns (2) and (3) report the results when we allow for differential sensitivity to lagged 
performance between the two segments.  The coefficients are estimated in a single pooled re-
gression in which each of the independent variables and month-objective fixed effects is inter-
acted with a direct-sold segment dummy variable.  Thus, the coefficients in Table 2 columns (2) 
and (3) are identical to those obtained by estimating a separate regression for each segment.  To 
allow for the possibility that flows are correlated both within mutual fund family and within time 
period, we cluster standard errors on both family and month.  For brevity, we report the coeffi-
cients on the control variables in an appendix table. 
  While the pooled sample regression confirms the well-known finding that both raw and 
risk-adjusted performance help to explain cross-sectional variation in fund flow (e.g., Gruber 
                                                           
12 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html   14 
(1996), Sirri and Tufano (1998), and Del Guercio and Tkac (2002)), it also masks significant 
heterogeneity in the flow-performance relation across market segments.  Consistent with our hy-
pothesis, when we contrast the results in columns (2) and (3), we find that fund flows in the di-
rect-sold segment are significantly more sensitive to risk-adjusted returns than fund flows in the 
broker-sold segment.  Specifically, while the estimated coefficients on lagged alpha are positive 
in both segments, the estimated coefficient in the direct-sold segment is larger (0.176 versus 
0.021), significantly different from zero (p-value of 0.000), and significantly different from the 
coefficient in the broker-sold segment (p-value of 0.001).  These coefficients imply that a one-
standard deviation increase in alpha will increase fund size over the next 12 months by approxi-
mately 6.18% in the direct-sold and 0.59% in the broker-sold segments, or in terms of dollars, by 
$86.9 million and $5.0 million respectively.
13  Since the typical actively-managed fund’s man-
agement fee is approximately 75 basis points, this implies incremental annual revenue to the 
fund of $651,660 for the average direct-sold fund and only $37,445 for the average broker-sold 
fund.  Thus, if families in the direct-sold segment could invest in the managers, analysts, or trad-
ing infrastructure that would generate this increase in alpha at lower annual cost than $651,660 
they would presumably do so, whereas families in the broker-sold segment have a much weaker 
incentive to make alpha-generating investments. 
When we instead focus on the sensitivity of flows to lagged raw returns, the pattern is re-
versed.  The estimated coefficient in the broker-sold segment is larger (0.135 versus 0.040), sig-
nificantly different from zero (p-value of 0.000), and significantly different from the coefficient 
                                                           
13 Four-factor alpha has a standard deviation of 2.93% in the direct-sold segment and 2.36% in the broker-sold seg-
ment. Thus, a one-standard deviation increase in alpha, holding raw return and other explanatory variables constant, 
implies an increase in annual flow of 6.18% in the direct-sold segment (0.176*2.93%*12) and 0.59% in the broker-
sold segment (0.021*2.36%*12). Multiplying by the average actively-managed fund size in the two segments re-
ported in Table 1, implies $86.9 million in incremental flow in the direct-sold segment and $5.0 million in the bro-
ker-sold segment.   15 
in the direct-sold segment (p-value of 0.032).   Regardless of whether the lower estimated sensi-
tivity of flows to risk-adjusted returns in the broker-sold segment is driven by the preferences of 
brokers or their clients, it should reduce the incentive for broker-sold funds to generate alpha. 
  The estimates in Panel B confirm that flows in the direct-sold segment remains most sen-
sitive to risk-adjusted performance, even when we control for abnormally high and low raw re-
turns.  The estimates also reveal that flows in the direct-sold segment are the most sensitive to 
extreme performance.  For example, net flows into the top performing funds and out of the bot-
tom performing funds in each investment objective are around three times larger in the direct-
sold segment than in the broker-sold segment.  More generally, we can reject the hypothesis that 
the coefficient on the top 20% dummy variable in the direct-sold segment is equal to that of the 
broker-sold segment with a p-value of 0.003.  For the bottom 20% dummy variable, the p-value 
is 0.026.
14  The fact that direct-sold funds are penalized more for poor performance reinforces 
their incentive to invest in skill, and may also reduce their incentive to bear systematic risk.
  Two other papers compare the relation between flow and past performance in the direct-
sold and broker-sold segments.  To test whether brokers attenuate the behavioral biases of their 
clients, Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) test for differences in return chasing behav-
ior, and find that the sensitivity of flows to raw returns is similar in both segments.  Their evi-
dence is not directly comparable to ours because they report results based on annual flows and do 
not include risk-adjusted performance measures in their regressions.  We show in the appendix 
that when we more closely match their specification, but simultaneously control for raw returns 
and 4-factor alphas, we again find that the sensitivity to 4-factor alphas is limited to the direct-
sold segment.  Keswani and Stolin (2011) use disaggregated monthly flow data in the United 
                                                           
14 Although we only report one specification in Table 2, the flow-performance relations are qualitatively unchanged 
when we constrain the coefficients on the fund-level controls to be equal across segments, omit the fund-level con-
trols, or omit lagged flows.  In the Appendix, we report a specification where the performance measures match BCT.   16 
Kingdom to test for differential sensitivities to risk-adjusted and raw returns across different dis-
tribution channels.  Their finding that direct-sold investor flows are the most sensitive to risk-
adjusted returns matches our finding for the U.S., suggesting that the incentive to generate alpha 
is likely to vary across market segments in the U.K. as well. 
III.  Do Families in the Direct-sold Segment Invest More in Active Management? 
  The across-segment differences in fund flows generate two predictions.  Because monthly 
flows into direct-sold funds are more sensitive to risk-adjusted returns, direct-sold funds have a 
stronger incentive to generate alpha through investments in active management.  At the same 
time, because monthly flows into broker-sold funds are more sensitive to raw returns, funds in 
the broker-sold segment have a stronger incentive to bear systematic risk, in the hopes of realiz-
ing higher raw returns.  While we can test the latter prediction directly, we cannot directly ob-
serve the inputs to generating alpha, such as the dollar investments in trading infrastructure or 
skilled personnel, nor can we observe the incentive structures internal to the fund.  We can, how-
ever, use those measures of mutual fund behavior from the literature that have been shown to be 
robustly consistent with funds seeking to generate alpha.  In this section, we use a variety of data 
sources to test both predictions. 
A.  Are Direct-sold Funds More Actively Managed? 
  In  Table  3,  we  test  for  differences  in  4-factor  alpha,  the  return  gap  measure  of 
Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008), the active share measure of Cremers and Petajisto (2009), 
and systematic risk.  Because we are testing for evidence of differential investments in active 
management, we exclude index funds.  
  All of the regressions in Table 3 include investment style-by-month fixed effects, so that 
each performance measure is relative to other actively managed funds with the same investment 
style, operating in the same month.  The main variable of interest is a dummy variable indicating   17 
that at least 75% of the fund’s TNA is distributed through the direct-sold segment; broker-sold 
funds are the omitted category.  We also include in each regression the same set of fund-level 
controls as Table 2 (unreported).  For example, we include the natural logarithm of fund i’s TNA 
in month t-1 to control for the fact that the cross-sectional correlation between fund size and fu-
ture returns tends to be negative (Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004)).  And, we include the 
standard deviation of net flows over the prior 12 months to control for the fact that more volatile 
investor flows may be associated with lower performance (Edelen (1999)).  Standard errors are 
clustered on both mutual fund family and month.  Panel A contains the full sample of actively 
managed funds, while Panel B restricts the sample to small cap growth funds.  To the extent that 
pricing of small cap stocks is less efficient than pricing of large cap stocks, the returns to invest-
ing in active management should be higher among small cap growth funds.  
Column (1) of Table 3 shows that direct-sold funds earn higher risk-adjusted, after-fee re-
turns than broker-sold funds.  The estimated difference is 9.6 basis points per month, statistically 
significant at the 1-percent level.  Panel B, however, shows an even more dramatic difference 
among small-cap growth funds.  We find that direct-sold small-cap growth funds outperform 
their broker-sold peers by 17.4 basis points per month (p-value of 0.001).  The fact that direct-
sold funds earn relatively higher returns when investing in small stocks is our first new piece of 
evidence that direct-sold funds invest more in active management than broker-sold funds.  
  In column (2), we focus on the return gap measure of Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng 
(2008), which is the difference between fund i’s actual gross return and the gross return implied 
by the fund’s lagged reported holdings.  This measure captures unobservables such as the value 
added by skilled managers or favorable IPO allocations, or the value destroyed by poor trade ex-
ecutions or agency costs.  We find that the majority of the difference in the returns of direct-sold   18 
and broker-sold funds can be explained by differences in return gaps.  Within the full sample of 
actively managed funds, the difference in the return gaps of direct-sold and broker-sold funds is 
6.1 basis points per month.  Within the subsample of small cap growth funds, the difference is 
12.0 basis points per month.  Both differences are significant at the 1-percent level. 
  In column (3), we focus on the active share measure of Cremers and Petajisto (2009), 
which is the fraction of fund i’s assets that would need to be traded to obtain a portfolio that mir-
rors fund i’s benchmark.  Because Cremers and Petajisto find evidence that funds that have both 
high active share and high tracking error outperform their peers, the dependent variable in col-
umn (3) is a dummy variable that identifies funds with above-median measures of both active 
share and tracking error (where we allow the median value to vary across investment objective-
year pairs).
15  Because active share and tracking error are positively correlated, the dependent 
variable equals one for 40.9 percent of the funds in the full sample, and 38.6 percent of the funds 
in the small cap growth fund sample. 
  We find strong evidence that direct-sold funds are more actively managed than broker-
sold funds.  Within the full sample, direct-sold funds are 9.8 percentage points (p-value of 0.002) 
more likely to have above-median values of both active share and tracking error than broker-sold 
funds.   Within the sample of small cap growth funds, the difference grows to 10.4 percentage 
points (p-value of 0.038).  Both differences are economically significant, suggesting that direct-
sold actively managed funds are more likely to be stock pickers than their broker-sold peers. 
  In unreported regressions, we restrict the sample to funds for which we observe Morn-
ingstar investment styles, a Morningstar rating, and a NASDAQ ticker.  Although these filters 
eliminate 43.2% of our fund-month observations, they serve several useful purposes.  When con-
                                                           
15 We thank Cremers and Petajisto for making their active share and tracking error measures available for download 
at www.petajisto.net/data.html.   19 
structing style-by-month fixed effects, the nine Morningstar investment styles allow for finer 
comparison groups than the six Standard & Poor’s investment styles available in CRSP.  They 
also make it easier to identify the full set of funds that invest in small cap equity.  Most im-
portantly, requiring that fund i has a Morningstar rating (which requires that it is at least three 
years old) and a ticker helps to insure that our findings are not being driven by incubation bias 
(Evans (2010)).  Within the full sample of funds, differences in returns are similar to those re-
ported in Panel A.  Within the sample of small cap funds, differences in returns are even larger 
than those reported in Panel B.  The difference in the 4-factor alphas of direct-sold and broker-
sold funds increases from 17.4 to 22.5 basis points per month (p-value of 0.020), and the differ-
ence in return gaps increases from 12.0 to 27.5 basis points per month (p-value of 0.000). 
  In the last column of Table 3, we test for differences in systematic risk.  We measure sen-
sitivity to systematic risk as the beta on the market portfolio in the standard one-factor model.  
We find that direct-sold funds have lower betas than broker-sold funds.  The difference is 0.042 
within the full sample (p-value of 0.050) and 0.106 within the sample of small-cap growth funds 
(p-value of 0.012).   Because flows into broker-sold funds are more sensitive to raw returns, and 
because higher betas are likely to generate higher raw returns, these across-segment differences 
in beta are broadly consistent with funds responding to the incentives implied by investor flows.  
However, within the subsample of funds with Morningstar data and a ticker, neither estimated 
difference in beta is statistically significant, suggesting that the tilt toward higher betas in the full 
sample might be driven by the incubation of broker-sold funds. 
  To provide additional evidence that differences in investor preferences drive differential 
investments in active management, we exploit two additional sources of variation in investor 
preferences.  In Panel C, we restrict the sample to direct-sold funds and replace the direct-sold   20 
dummy variable with the fraction of family assets that are distributed in the direct-sold segment.  
Because families tend to focus their distribution on a single retail segment, this fraction has a 
mean of 91.5%.  However, it also has a standard deviation of 18%, allowing us to exploit varia-
tion in the relative importance of direct-sold investors to fund families. 
  We find that direct-sold funds offered by families more squarely focused on serving the 
direct-sold segment have higher performance measures.  A one standard deviation increase in the 
fraction of family assets in the direct-sold segment is predicted to increase a direct-sold fund’s 4-
factor alpha by 2.6 basis points per month, return gap by 3.0 basis points per month, and the 
probability of having above-median active share and tracking error by 2.7 percentage points, 
each significant at the 10% level or better.  In contrast, the effect on beta is neither economically 
nor statistically significant.  In other words, our findings based on variation within the direct-sold 
segment are broadly consistent with our findings based on variation across segments. 
  Another potential source of variation in investor preferences comes from changes in the 
distribution strategies of fund families.  No families switch from broker-sold distribution to di-
rect-sold distribution during our sample period, but three families switch from direct-sold distri-
bution to broker-sold distribution: Columbia Funds and Scudder Funds in January 2002, and 
Strong Funds in January 2001.  These three families manage 32 actively managed domestic equi-
ty funds in 2001 and 49 funds in 2002, representing between 3.2 and 4.4 percent of our sample.  
To be consistent with our earlier evidence, we predict that families switching into the broker-sold 
segment will internalize their weaker incentive to generate alpha.  We also predict that families 
are more likely to leave the direct-sold segment when they have underperformed comparable di-
rect-sold funds. 
  To test these predictions in Panel D we replace the direct-sold fund dummy variable in   21 
Panel A with a dummy variable that is equal to one if the fund is direct-sold during the entire 
sample period (stable distribution).   For the three families that switch distribution, we include a 
dummy variable that is equal to one in the months before the switch to broker-sold, and a dummy 
variable that is equal to one in the months during and after the switch to broker-sold.  To the ex-
tent that families are slow to change their investments in active management, we are likely to 
underestimate the magnitude of these changes.  Despite this caveat and our modest sample size, 
our findings are broadly consistent with our predictions.  Switchers’ funds have lower alphas and 
lower return gap than direct-sold funds after the fund switches to broker-sold.  In both cases, we 
can reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on the post-switch dummy variable is equal to the 
coefficient on the direct-sold funds with stable distribution dummy at the 1-percent level.  Per-
haps helping to explain why they switch distribution, switchers’ funds are also significantly less 
actively managed than other direct-sold funds before the switch, with higher average betas.  
B.  Are Families more Specialized by Investment Style in the Direct-sold Segment? 
Mutual fund families must decide how many distinct investment styles to offer.  Mutual 
fund investors who value “one-stop shopping” may prefer to invest with a large fund family that 
offers a variety of investment styles.
16  On the other hand, Siggelkow (2003), Massa (2003), and 
Ciccotello et al. (2006) show empirically that investors pay for this convenience with lower risk-
adjusted returns.  Massa (2003) argues that this lower performance arises from diseconomies of 
scope in the co-production of fund variety and fund performance, so that families must choose 
whether to target investors who value variety or investors who value performance. 
Given the greater sensitivity of investors in the direct-sold segment to risk-adjusted re-
turns, we expect direct-sold families to offer a narrower range of investment styles.  To test this 
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zon and consequent desire to take advantage of the option to switch funds within a family at no explicit cost.   22 
prediction, we use data on Morningstar investment styles between 1996 and 2002.  Specifically, 
we  compare  two  measures  of  style  specialization  for  direct-sold  families  versus  broker-sold 
families: the number of Morningstar styles offered by the family and the percentage of actively 
managed assets in the family’s investment specialty.
17  We report statistics in Table 4 for 1996-
2002, and separately for 2002 (to match the sample period of data available for later tests). 
For each family, we define its investment specialty as the Morningstar category in which 
it manages the most assets, and compute the percentage of actively managed domestic equity as-
sets in this specialty style.  On average in 2002, direct-sold families have 84.4% of their actively 
managed assets invested in their investment specialty Morningstar category versus 71.0% for 
broker-sold families (differences statistically significant at the 1-percent level).  Further, direct-
sold families offer funds in 2.2 different Morningstar style categories, versus 3.5 different cate-
gories for broker-sold families (differences statistically significant at the 1-percent level).  Rec-
ognizing that larger fund families tend to offer more styles and are less concentrated by style, 
Table 4 also reports comparisons of the family style focus measures after controlling for family 
size.  We find that in both 2002 and the full sample period, direct-sold families are significantly 
more specialized by investment style than broker-sold families.  These differences are consistent 
with direct-sold families making organizational decisions that help them better compete for in-
vestors who value alpha.   
  Finally, we test for changes in the extent of specialization among the three families that 
switch from direct-sold to broker-sold.  In column (4), we find that switchers are less concentrat-
ed than the typical direct-sold family both before and after the switch to the broker-sold segment 
(p-values of 0.022 and 0.000), but we cannot reject that the coefficients are equal before and af-
                                                           
17 An alternative summary measure is a Herfindahl index.  We report the % of actively managed assets in the spe-
cialty style for ease of interpretation, but testing for differences in Herfindahl indices leads to the same inferences.   23 
ter the switch (p-value of 0.416).  In column (8), we find that switchers offer more styles than the 
typical direct-sold family both before and after the switch (p-values of 0.000 and 0.000).  In this 
case, we can reject that the coefficients are equal before and after the switch (p-value of 0.006).  
In other words, not only do we find that the three families that switch market segments are less 
specialized than the typical direct-sold family before the switch, but we also find some evidence 
that these families become even less specialized after the switch. 
C.  Are Direct-sold Funds Less Likely to Outsource Portfolio Management? 
A mutual fund family can choose to manage a fund’s portfolio in-house, using its own 
employees as portfolio managers, or it can choose to outsource portfolio management to an unaf-
filiated asset management firm via a subadvisory contract.  For example, while the John Hancock 
II Value Fund is marketed and distributed to investors by John Hancock, the portfolio is man-
aged by Invesco, an asset management firm with its own brand of in-house funds.  Chen, Hong, 
and Kubik (2012) find that subadvised funds underperform in-house funds by 50 to 72 basis 
points per year, and conclude that it is more difficult to extract effort from subadvisors than from 
in-house managers.   Duong (2010)  and Chuprinin,  Massa, and Schumacher (2011)  find  that 
subadvised funds underperform the subadvisor’s own brand of in-house funds by 90 to 127 basis 
points per year, and conclude that the underperformance arises from cross-subsidization.  Re-
gardless of the mechanism, the fact that subadvised funds earn lower risk-adjusted returns than 
their peers should make subadvisors less attractive to direct-sold funds than to broker-sold funds.  
We test this prediction. 
The SEC requires mutual funds to disclose to investors whether the portfolio is managed 
by a subadvisor.  To identify the subset of actively managed domestic equity funds that hire (un-
affiliated) subadvisors, we conduct text searches of all N-30D annual report filings in the SEC’s   24 
EDGAR database in 2002 for variants of the word ‘subadvisor’ or subadvisory’.
18  In columns 
(9) and (10) of Table 4, we estimate linear probability models predicting whether fund i employs 
a  subadvisor  in  2002.    We  find  that  direct-sold  families  are  about  half  as  likely  to  hire 
subadvisors as broker-sold families.  Specifically, approximately 22% of broker-sold funds have 
a subadvisor versus approximately 12% of direct-sold funds (p-values of 0.047 and 0.055).  This 
difference is consistent with direct-sold families being more likely to recognize the adverse ef-
fects of outsourcing on manager incentives and fund performance, and being less willing to sac-
rifice performance in order to meet other family objectives, such as expanding fund offerings to 
include investment styles outside of the family’s current expertise. 
D.  Do Direct-sold Funds Employ Managers With Different Educational Backgrounds? 
In this section, we exploit data on the educational backgrounds of mutual fund managers 
across a sample of actively managed domestic equity mutual funds in 2002.  Our motivation is 
Chevalier and Ellison's (1999) finding that managers who attend undergraduate institutions with 
higher average student SAT scores earn higher risk-adjusted returns (see also Christoffersen and 
Sarkissian (2009) and Li, Zhang, and Zhou (2011)).  To the extent that managers from these 
schools have greater ability and/or professional networks (or better outside options), they should 
cost more for mutual fund families to hire and retain.  At the same time, these managers should 
be the most attractive to actively managed mutual funds with performance-sensitive investors, 
like those in the direct-sold segment.  These considerations lead us to predict that direct-sold 
funds will be the most likely to employ analysts and managers from “better” undergraduate insti-
tutions.  Because families have direct control only over the portfolio manager assigned to their 
                                                           
18 In  some  cases,  the  filing  will  identify  that  a  subadvisor  manages  the  portfolio,  but  also  discloses  that  the 
subadvisor is an affiliate of the family, typically indicating that the subadvisory firm is legally a subsidiary, or has a 
common owner.  Because the affiliated subadvisory agreements do not reflect the same economic decision or market 
forces described above, we focus our analysis on the sample of unaffiliated subadvisors.  We find that 8.6% of ADE 
funds on CRSP in 2002 are subadvised by an affiliate.   25 
in-house funds, we exclude subadvised funds from our tests.  
We possess Morningstar data on the educational backgrounds of 654 actively managed 
domestic equity in-house fund managers working in 2002.
19  These managers attended 239 dif-
ferent undergraduate institutions.  Of the 232 schools located in the United States, we are able to 
obtain acceptance rates for 223, and the interquartile range of student math SAT scores for 206.  
Our source for these data is the U.S. Department of Education National Center for Education 
Statistics College Navigator website.  Because these data reflect student characteristics in 2007, 
our maintained assumption is that acceptance rates and SAT scores have been relatively stable 
over time.  We construct three dummy variable proxies for manager ability.  The first dummy 
variable identifies if the manager has an undergraduate degree from one of the 25 colleges and 
universities with the lowest acceptance rates within our sample (ranging from 8.8 percent for 
Harvard to 24.5 percent for Notre Dame).  To capture the quantitative nature of portfolio man-
agement, the other two dummy variables indicate whether the manager’s degree is from a school 
with a mid-point math SAT score in the top quartile (above 650) or the bottom quartile (below 
560) of the schools in our sample.  
We test our prediction in Table 5.  The unit of observation is actively managed domestic 
equity fund i in 2002.  For funds with multiple named managers, we equally weight our proxies 
for manager skill.  For example, the dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the fraction of 
managers who attended a top 25 undergraduate institution.  Because larger families may have the 
scale required to hire better managers, we report specifications that control for the natural log of 
family assets under management.  We cluster standard errors on mutual fund family.   
While we estimate that direct-sold funds are more likely to hire managers with degrees 
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board members of the firms in which they invest.  We thank them for sharing their data for 2002.   26 
from the 25 most selective institutions relative to broker-sold fund, the difference is not signifi-
cantly different from zero (p-value of 0.478).  However, we do find that direct-sold funds are 
significantly more likely to employ managers from top-quartile math-SAT schools (61.1 percent 
versus 51.1 percent; p-value of 0.072), and significantly less likely to employ managers from 
bottom-quartile math-SAT schools (7.6 percent versus 15.2 percent; p-value of 0.0030).  While 
we recognize that these school-level measures are noisy proxies for differences in manager abil-
ity, our findings are nevertheless consistent with funds in the direct-sold segment investing more 
in skilled portfolio managers.  Inferences are unchanged when we control for family size. 
  Educational data also allow us to explore whether average differences  in market risk 
across segments are related to average differences in manager education.  When Chevalier and 
Ellison (1999) study the impact of MBA degrees on fund performance, they conclude that “the 
higher returns achieved by MBAs are entirely attributable to their greater holdings of systematic 
risk” (p. 877).  Furthermore, Li et al. (2011) find no relation between a hedge fund’s alpha and 
whether  its  manager  has  an  MBA  degree.    Because  direct-sold  fund  flow  responds  to  risk-
adjusted returns, if managers with MBA degrees are more expensive to hire, direct-sold funds 
should be less likely to hire them.  Indeed, we find that funds in the direct-sold segment are less 
likely to hire managers with MBAs (54.1 percent versus 63.4 percent; p-value of 0.039), and 
more likely to hire managers with an advanced degree other than an MBA, such as a Ph.D. or JD 
(16.5 percent versus 11.4 percent; p-value of 0.083).   
IV. There is no Puzzle of Active Management in the Direct-sold Segment  
  We conclude our empirical analysis by documenting that the persistent underperformance 
of actively managed funds is driven by broker-sold funds, which face (and internalize) a weaker 
incentive to generate alpha.  The dependent variable in each regression in Table 6 is fund i's four-
factor alpha in month t.  As in our earlier return regressions, we include a separate fixed effect   27 
for each investment objective-month pair, and we cluster standard errors on both month t and 
mutual fund family j. 
  We begin with a pooled regression that ignores the distinction between direct-sold and 
broker-sold funds.  The independent variable of interest is a dummy variable indicating whether 
fund i is an index fund.  To the extent that actively managed funds earn the same risk-adjusted, 
after-fee returns as index funds, the coefficient on the index fund dummy variable will be zero.  
This is the equilibrium condition implied by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Berk and Green 
(2004).  In contrast, we find that index funds outperform actively managed funds by 7.3 basis 
points per month (p-value of 0.049).  The implied underperformance of 87 basis points per year 
is slightly higher than the 65 basis points estimated by Gruber (1996) and the 67 basis points es-
timated by French (2008), but quite close to the 83 basis point average difference in expense ra-
tios within our sample.  Therefore, when we ignore heterogeneity in the bundles of non-portfolio 
management services that retail investors receive, actively managed funds appear unable to earn 
back any of their incremental fees—a finding that is consistent with Malkiel (1995). 
  Limiting the sample to a single market segment allows us to hold constant the bundle of 
non-portfolio management services that retail investors receive.  We start with the direct-sold 
segment, where differences in the fees charged by actively managed and index funds are likely to 
reflect differential investments in active management.  In column (2), the index fund dummy var-
iable measures the returns of direct-sold index funds relative to direct-sold actively managed 
funds with the same investment objective in the same month.  The evidence that actively man-
aged funds underperform index funds is weak.  The estimated coefficient on the index fund 
dummy variable is statistically indistinguishable from zero (p-value of 0.607).  And, the estimat-
ed underperformance of 1.8 basis points per month is much smaller than the 6.9 basis point per   28 
month difference implied by the higher average expense ratios of actively managed funds (not 
reported).  In other words, the average direct-sold actively managed fund appears to earn back its 
investment in active management, just as the models in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Berk 
and Green (2004) predict.   
  The evidence of underperformance is different when we restrict the sample to the broker-
sold segment.  In column (3), among funds that bundle investments in portfolio management 
with investments in broker services, active funds underperform by 9.3 basis points per month (p-
value of 0.017).  Interestingly, the estimated underperformance is even larger than the 5.7 basis 
points per month difference in average expense ratios, just as in Malkiel (1995) and Gil-Bazo 
and Ruiz-Verdu (2009).  To the extent that broker-sold funds are investing their management 
fees  in  active  management,  they  are  doing  so  less  successfully  than  comparable  direct-sold 
funds.
20  However, to the extent that broker-sold funds are instead using their management fees 
to pay for distribution, we should not be surprised that higher fees drag down after-fee returns. 
  Note that these across-segment performance differences are robust to alternative specifi-
cations (reported in the appendix).  When we estimate separate Fama MacBeth regressions for 
each market segment, the estimated underperformance of actively managed funds relative to in-
dex funds is 0.3 basis points per month in the direct-sold segment (p-value of 0.931) versus 10.1 
basis points per month in the broker-sold segment (p-value of 0.011).  When we restrict the sam-
ple to funds with tickers, Morningstar ratings, and Morningstar investment objectives (which 
limits the sample period to 1996-2002), the estimated underperformance of actively managed 
funds is 0.6 basis points per month in the direct-sold segment (p-value of 0.914) versus 11.0 ba-
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sis points per month in the broker-sold segment (p-value of 0.064). 
  In the remaining columns of Table 6, we estimate pooled regressions that distinguish be-
tween actively and passively managed funds available in the two market segments.  Excluding 
fund-level control variables, the estimated coefficients on the three dummy variables measure 
average risk-adjusted, after-fee performance relative to the average broker-sold actively managed 
fund (which is the omitted category).   In column (4), we see that direct-sold actively managed 
funds outperform actively managed broker-sold funds by 8.5 basis points per month (p-value of 
0.000).  Moreover, the performance of direct-sold actively managed funds is statistically indis-
tinguishable from that of the index funds available in both segments.  Finally, in column (5), 
when we control for the full set of fund characteristics, we find that direct-sold actively managed 
funds outperform broker-sold actively managed funds by 9.1 basis points per month (p-value of 
0.002).  We even find mild support for direct-sold actively managed funds outperforming direct-
sold index funds (p-value of 0.068) and broker-sold index funds (p-value of 0.064).  In contrast, 
we find no performance differences between broker-sold actively managed funds and any of the 
index funds.  The implication is that broker-sold actively managed funds earn the average after-
fee alphas one would expect given their (high) fees and other fund characteristics, whereas di-
rect-sold actively managed funds significantly outperform.   
V. Conclusion 
  While most mutual fund studies implicitly assume a homogeneous product market serv-
ing homogeneous investors, we demonstrate that the retail mutual fund market is more accurately 
described as a segmented market catering to two distinct types of investors.  One segment serves 
self-directed  investors  focused  on  maximizing  after-fee  risk-adjusted  performance,  while  the 
other segment caters to investors who are uncomfortable making investment decisions without   30 
the advice of their broker.  The across-segment differences in investor and fund behavior that we 
document allow us to shed new light on both the underperformance of the average actively man-
aged retail mutual fund and the continuing demand by retail investors for active management. 
  The direct-sold segment resembles the world of Berk and Green (2004).  Investor dollars 
flow to direct-sold funds with higher after-fee alphas, direct-sold funds respond to these flow-
based incentives by making a wide variety of operational decisions shown to increase alpha, and 
there is little evidence that actively managed funds underperform index funds.  These findings 
underscore the need for mutual fund researchers to take mutual fund incentives into account 
when studying mutual fund performance.  In particular, estimates based on the full cross-section 
of mutual funds may lead researchers to overstate both the efficiency of financial markets and 
the deadweight costs of active management.  In addition, because direct-sold funds have the 
strongest incentive to hire and incentivize skilled managers, tests for manager skill will be most 
powerful when they focus on the direct-sold segment.   
The fact that underperformance is limited to the broker-sold segment helps to rationalize 
demand for active management in the direct-sold segment.  But, it begs the question of why vir-
tually all the assets in the broker-sold segment remain actively managed.  Since retail investors 
who seek investment advice from brokers are likely ignorant of the underperformance (being the 
`disadvantaged’ investors in Gruber (1996)), the question becomes why brokers continue to rec-
ommend that their clients invest in broker-sold actively managed funds, which provide the same 
bundle of portfolio management and advice as broker-sold index funds, but earn significantly 
lower after-fee returns.  Findings from a burgeoning literature suggest that the most likely an-  31 
swer is an agency conflict between brokers and their clients.
21  However, given the discomfort 
that many investors reportedly face making financial decisions and bearing risk, it is unclear 
whether clients would be better off investing without their brokers.  Regardless, our findings im-
ply that the demand for investment advice from brokers is being transformed into demand for 
underperforming actively managed funds.  Gaining a more complete understanding of investor 
welfare under different models of broker compensation is an important goal for future research. 
                                                           
21 See  Christoffersen,  Evans,  and  Musto  (2012),  Chalmers  and  Reuter  (2012),  Mullainathan,  Nöth,  and  Schoar 
(2012), and Anagol, Cole, and Sarkar (2012) for empirical evidence, and Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) and 
Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) for theoretical models of the impact of brokers and bundled advice on investor welfare.   32 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A. Distribution of Domestic Equity Mutual Fund Assets across Market Segments (1992 and 2004) 
The table below uses distribution channel data at the share class level from Financial Research Corporation (FRC) and data on TNA from the CRSP Survivor-
bias-free Mutual Funds database in 1992 and 2004.  The first three columns report aggregate total net assets (TNA) in domestic equity mutual fund share classes 
from two major retail fund market segments: direct-sold and broker-sold, with each segment divided into actively managed funds and index funds.  We exclude 
funds in CRSP that cannot be classified as direct-sold or broker-sold, which collectively represent 17.1% of assets invested in domestic equity funds over our 
sample period (8.4% are invested in institutional funds and the other 8.7% are invested in funds that are unclassified by FRC).  We define domestic equity funds 
as those with a Standard and Poor’s investment objective of aggressive growth (AGG), mid-cap growth (GMC), growth and income (GRI), growth (GRO), in-
come and growth (ING), or small-cap growth (SCG).  Market share within Segment is the percentage of aggregate TNA within the segment (direct-sold or bro-
ker-sold) that is actively managed versus passively managed, and should be read across the row.  For each fund family, we define a family’s primary segment as 
the segment with the largest percentage of family assets distributed through that segment. Number of Families is the number of families in the CRSP database 
that have at least one domestic equity mutual fund that are in that row’s primary segment. For example, in 1992, 97 families have the direct-sold channel as their 
primary segment because this is segment through which they distribute the most TNA. Average % TNA in Primary Segment is the average across families of the 









   
  Aggregate TNA in  
Domestic Equity Mutual Funds 
($Billions)   
Market Share  
within Segment 





Average % TNA 
in Primary  
Segment    Active  Passive  Total    Active  Passive  Total   
1992                     
Direct-sold  $154.1  $8.4  $162.4    94.8%  5.2%  100%    97  98.1% 
                      Broker-sold  $148.4  $0.4  $148.8    99.7%  0.3%  100%    133  99.7% 
                      Total  $302.4  $8.8  $311.2    97.2%  2.8%  100%    230   
                      2004                     
Direct-sold  $984.6  $189.6  $1,174.2    83.9%  16.1%  100%    192  96.5% 
                      Broker-sold  $779.0  $14.6  $793.7    98.2%  1.8%  100%    153  92.2% 
                      Total  $1,763.6  $204.2  $1,967.8    89.6%  10.4%  100%    345     36 
Panel B. Fund-level Summary Statistics for Domestic Equity Mutual Funds (1992-2004) 
This panel provides the mean and standard deviation of fund-level variables from CRSP.  The unit of observation is domestic equity mutual fund i in month t.  
The sample begins in January 1992 and ends in December 2004, and is restricted to those funds that distribute at least 75 percent of their assets through either the 
direct-sold or broker-sold market segment.  
   











Monthly Return (%) 
  Mean  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev 
Actively Managed Funds                   
                        Direct-sold  440.2  1,404.1  4,923.9  1.29  0.74  0.09  0.17  139.3%  517.6%  0.92  5.92 
                        Broker-sold  615.7  839.5  3,279.3  1.57  1.29  0.40  0.27  89.1%  80.2%  0.80  5.46 
                        Index Funds                     
                        Direct-sold  26.3  3,637.8  12,211.6  0.44  0.36  0.02  0.07  25.0%  57.6%  0.78  5.02 
                        Broker-sold  16.5  353.0  514.7  0.86  0.45  0.31  0.29  24.4%  31.3%  0.64  4.82   37 
Table 2.  Monthly Flow-Performance Sensitivity Across Market Segments, Actively Managed funds (1993-2004) 
These panels report coefficients from panel regressions where the dependent variable is monthly net percentage fund flow, using the standard definition of flow, 
the growth in TNA less capital appreciation.  The unit of observation is actively managed domestic equity fund i in month t.  All regressions include the follow-
ing fund-level control variables, the coefficients of which are not reported: lagged expense ratio, lagged no-load fund dummy, lagged 12b-1 fee, lagged log of 
fund TNA, lagged log of family TNA, and current fund age measured in years. Column (1) contains all retail funds in either the direct-sold or broker-sold seg-
ments. The regression in column (1) contains investment objective-by-month fixed effects. The coefficients in columns (2) and (3) are from a single regression, 
where the coefficients in column (2) correspond to variables interacted with a direct-sold dummy, which is equal to one if 75 percent or more of fund i’s TNA is 
distributed through the Direct-sold channel. The regression in columns (2) and (3) include distribution market segment-by-investment objective-by-month fixed 
effects.  Panel B adds dummy variables that indicate whether fund i's net return in month t-1 was in either the top or bottom 20% of funds within the same Stand-
ard and Poor’s investment objective (but across segments), but otherwise is the same specification as Panel A. Observations where the absolute value of net flow 
is greater than 100% are deleted (less than 1% of the sample fit this definition.) Standard errors are clustered on both fund family and month and are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Panel A. Base specification 
  (1)    (2)  (3) 
Dependent variable:  Net flow (t)    Net flow (t) 
Sample:  Both segments    Direct-sold  Broker-sold 
         









          Net return (t-1)   0.077
** 
(0.034) 













          H0: Coefficient on lagged net flows is equal for Direct and Broker        0.459 
H0: Coefficient on lagged net return is equal for Direct and Broker        0.032
** 
H0: Coefficient on 4-factor alpha is equal for Direct and Broker        0.001
*** 
          Include fund-level controls?  Yes      Yes 
Include fund-level controls by segment?  No      Yes 
Include Investment-objective-by-month fixed effects?  Yes      Yes 
Include Investment-objective-by-month-by segment fixed effects?  No      Yes 
          Sample size  122,111      122,111 
R
2  0.0784      0.0887   38 
Panel B. Specification that allows for non-linearities in sensitivity to raw returns 
 
  (1)    (2)  (3) 
Dependent variable:  Net flow (t)    Net flow (t) 
Sample:  Both segments    Direct-sold  Broker-sold 
         









          Net return (t-1)   0.019 
(0.041) 



































          H0: Coefficient on lagged net flows is equal for Direct and Broker        0.448 
H0: Coefficient on lagged net return is equal for Direct and Broker        0.008
*** 
H0: Coefficient on Top 20% Dummy is equal for Direct and Broker        0.003
*** 
H0: Coefficient on Bottom 20% dummy is equal for Direct and Broker        0.026
** 
H0: Coefficient on 4-factor alpha is equal for Direct and Broker        0.001
*** 
          Include fund-level controls?  Yes      Yes 
Include fund-level controls by segment?  No      Yes 
Include Investment-objective-by-month fixed effects?  Yes      Yes 
Include Investment-objective-by-month-by segment fixed effects?  No      Yes 
          Sample size  122,111      122,111 
R
2  0.0794      0.0900   39 
Table 3. Monthly Fund Performance of Actively Managed Funds Across Market Segments (1993-2004) 
The table below reports coefficients from panel regressions of fund i’s monthly performance on fund and family characteristics.  The sample is restricted to non-
specialty actively managed domestic equity funds operating between January 1993 and December 2004 for which we possess fund-level distribution channel data 
from FRC.  The performance measure in column (1) is fund i’s four-factor alpha estimated from net returns over the prior 24 months, while in column (2) it is 
fund i’s return gap measure (i.e., the difference between fund i’s gross returns and the gross returns predicted based on its lagged holdings, as calculated in 
Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008)).  The dependent variable in column (3) identifies those funds with above-median values of active share and tracking error 
as calculated in Cremers and Petajisto (2009), where we allow the median value to vary across investment objective-year pairs. The fact that data on active share 
and tracking error are only available in those months that mutual funds disclose their holdings explains the smaller number of observations in column (3).  In 
column (4), we measure a fund’s 1-factor beta as the beta on the market portfolio in the one-factor model. All regressions in all panels include investment objec-
tive-by-month fixed effects and the following fund-level control variables: lagged expense ratio, lagged no-load fund dummy, lagged 12b-1 fee, lagged log of 
fund TNA, lagged log of family TNA, current turnover, current fund age measured in years, net flows into fund i between month t-12 and t-1, and the standard 
deviation of net flows over this same period.  The direct-sold fund dummy variable is equal to one if 75 percent or more of fund i’s TNA is distributed through 
the direct-sold segment, and zero otherwise. Thus, the omitted category is the funds distributed through the broker-sold segment. Panel B restricts the sample to 
actively managed small-cap growth funds, but is otherwise identical to Panel A.  Panel C restricts the sample to direct-sold funds and replaces the direct-sold 
dummy variable with the fraction of family assets that are distributed in the direct-sold segment. Panel D contains the same funds as Panel A, but extends the 
distribution-related dummy variables to capture the fact that three mutual fund families switch from direct-sold to broker-sold distribution during our sample pe-
riod (Strong, Columbia, and Scudder), and no families switch from broker-sold to direct-sold. Thus, Direct-sold with Stable Distribution dummy is equal to one 
for funds in families that remain direct-sold over the entire sample period. The Switcher when Direct-Sold dummy equals one in the months before the switch to 
broker-sold distribution, while the Switcher when Broker-sold dummy equals one in the months after the switch to broker-sold distribution. Columbia and Scud-
der switch to broker-sold distribution in January 2002, while Strong switches in January 2001. These three families manage 32 funds in 2001 (about 3.2% of all 
funds) and 49 funds in 2002 (4.4% of all funds). Standard errors are clustered on both fund family and month, and are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, * indi-
cate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Panel A. All Actively Managed Domestic Equity funds 


















       












          Sample size  118,552  94,424  21,876  118,552 
          R
2  0.1143  0.0261  0.1362  0.1355 
   40 
Table 3. Monthly Fund Performance of Actively Managed Funds Across Market Segments (continued) 
Panel B. Sample Restricted to Actively Managed Small-Cap Growth Funds 
 














         












          Sample size  22,450  18,489  4,463  22,450 
          R
2  0.1783  0.0198  0.1760  0.1330 
 
Panel C. Sample Restricted to Direct-sold Active Domestic Equity Funds 
 














         











          Sample size  48,955  41,002  8,806  48,955 
          R
2  0.0977  0.0362  0.1962  0.0823 
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Table 3. Monthly Fund Performance of Actively Managed Funds Across Market Segments (continued) 
 
Panel D. Active Domestic Equity Funds Switching from Direct-sold to Broker-Sold 
 














         
































          P-value for H0:  Before switch = After switch  0.418  0.192  0.096
*  0.472 
P-value for H0:  Before switch: Switcher =Direct  0.107  0.829  0.000
***  0.029
** 
P-value for H0:  After switch: Switcher = Direct  0.001
***  0.003
***  0.495  0.216 
          Sample size  118,552  97,229  21,876  118,552 
          R
2  0.1143  0.0254  0.1372  0.1355   42 
Table 4. Fund Family Specialization by Morningstar Investment Style and Use of Subadvisors Across Market Segments  
This table contains regressions of measures of family specialization by Morningstar investment style on market segment dummies and on family TNA in actively 
managed funds.  In columns (1) through (4) the dependent variable is the maximum fraction of family assets in a single Morningstar style. To compute this we 
aggregate the TNA of each actively managed domestic equity fund of a family for each of the nine Morningstar styles (small-cap growth, large-cap value, etc.) to 
compute the fraction of assets in each style. In columns (5) through (8) the dependent variable is the number of different styles offered by the family, which rang-
es from one to nine. The omitted category is a dummy variable equal to one if the family’s primary market segment is broker-sold. The specifications in columns 
(4) and (8) mirror those in Table 3 Panel D. In columns (9) and (10) the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the portfolio management of the 
fund is outsourced to an unaffiliated asset management firm via a subadvisory contract. Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) use only data from 2002 to match samples 
in columns (9) and (10). Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) use data from 1996 to 2002, which is the period for which we possess data on Morningstar style catego-
ries. We include year fixed-effects whenever the sample period is more than one year. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)    (9)  (10) 
  Maximum fraction of assets in single  
Morningstar style 
  Number of Morningstar styles offered by the 
mutual fund family (ranges from 1-9) 
  Is the fund managed 
by a subadvisor? 
 















                         
 
     
   
     
       
























                          Direct-sold family with stable 
distribution dummy (t)        0.067
*** 
(0.017) 
        -0.469
*** 
(0.131) 
     
                          Switcher when direct-sold (t)        -0.117 
(0.079) 
        1.369
*** 
(0.465) 
     
                          Switcher when broker-sold (t)        -0.180
*** 
(0.020) 
        2.978
*** 
(0.393) 
     
                          Ln Family TNA in Active funds  


















    -0.002 
(0.009) 






























                          Sample size  295  295  2,105  2,105    295  295  2,105  2,105    1,243  1,198 
                          R
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Table 5.  Mutual Fund Manager Educational Backgrounds Across Market Segments (2002)   
This table uses Morningstar data on the educational backgrounds of actively managed domestic equity fund managers in 2002. For each of the 654 managers 
directly employed by a mutual fund family, we observe the name of the undergraduate college or university whether the manager later earned an MBA, or some 
other advanced degree (PhD, JD, MD). We obtain (recent) admissions rates for 243 of the 276 different undergraduate institutions from U.S. Department of Edu-
cation’s National Center for Education Statistics College Navigator website.  We obtain the interquartile range of (recent) student math SAT scores for 251 un-
dergraduate institutions.  We classify schools as being in the top (bottom) quartile of math SAT scores when the midpoint of the interquartile range is above 650 
(below 560).  Each column is a separate regression and the omitted variable is a dummy variable indicating that at least 75% of the TNA of the fund is distributed 
through the institutional segment. The dependent variable in column (1) and (2) is the fraction of a fund’s portfolio managers who attended one of the 25 most 
selective U.S. undergraduate institutions (based on admission rates).  In columns (3) through (6) it is the fraction of the fund’s managers that attended undergrad-
uate institutions within the top and bottom quartiles of the math SAT score distribution.  In Columns (7) and (8), it is the fraction of a fund’s managers that ob-
tained an MBA.  In columns (9) and (10) it is the fraction of the fund’s managers that report having an advanced degree other than an MBA (PhD, JD, M.A., 
M.S.).  We cluster standard errors on mutual fund family, and report them in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 






from Top 25 
US School 
 
% Managers from US 
School with Math 
SAT scores in Top 
Quartile 
 
% Managers from US 
School with Math SAT 
scores in Bottom 
Quartile 
 




% Managers that 
report having other 
advanced degree 
 









































                             
Ln Family TNA in  




    0.044
*** 
(0.010) 
    -0.022
*** 
(0.007) 
    0.021
** 
(0.009) 
    0.004 
(0.006) 































                             
Sample size  618  618    597  597    597  597    618  618    618  618 
R
2  0.0014
  0.0231    0.0116
  0.0694    0.0117  0.0453    0.0110  0.0246
    0.0067  0.0077 
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Table 6. Monthly Fund 4-Factor Alphas of Actively Managed and Index Funds Across Market Segments (1993-2004) 
The table below reports coefficients from panel regressions of fund i’s monthly 4-factor alpha on fund and family characteristics in a sample of domestic equity 
funds operating between January 1993 and December 2004 for which we possess distribution channel data from FRC.  Fund i’s four-factor alpha is estimated 
from net returns over the prior 24 months.  The Index fund dummy variable equals one if fund i is passively managed, and the Active dummy variables equal one 
if fund i is actively managed. The Direct-sold dummy variable equals one if 75 percent or more of fund i’s TNA is distributed through the direct-sold channel.  
The Broker-sold dummy variable equals one if 75 percent or more of fund i’s TNA is distributed through the Broker-sold channel. Column (1) contains all retail 
funds, while columns (2) and (3) are restricted to funds in the direct-sold or broker-sold segments.  Columns (4) and (5) include funds from both segments.  All 
regressions include CRSP Standard and Poor’s investment category-by-month fixed effects.  Column (5)  also includes the following fund-level control variables: 
lagged expense ratio, lagged no-load fund dummy, lagged 12b-1 fee, lagged log of fund TNA, lagged log of family TNA, current turnover, current fund age 
measured in years, net flows into fund i between month t-12 and t-1, and the standard deviation of net flows over this same period.  Standard errors are clustered 
on both month and family and are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Dependent variable:  4-Factor Alpha (t) 
Sample:  Both segments  Direct-sold  Broker-sold  Both segments 
            Index fund dummy (t)  0.073
** 
(0.034)   
     
            Active fund dummy (t)  Omitted 
category   
     
            Direct-sold dummy (t) *  










            Direct-sold dummy (t) *  
Active fund (t)   
Omitted 







            Broker-sold dummy (t) *  









            Broker-sold dummy (t)) *  







            Fund level control variables?  No  No  No  No  Yes 
            Investment objective*Month fixed 
effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
            Sample size  122,833  51,469  71,364  122,833  122,833 
            R
2  0.1135  0.0974  0.1458  0.1137  0.1153 
  
Appendix 
In Table A1 we replicate the summary statistics reported in Table 1, except that we add 
the institutional segment.  We classify a fund as being institutional when at least 75% of its as-
sets are sold through share classes focused on that segment.  Collectively, institutional funds 
manage a relatively small 8.4% of the assets invested in nonspecialized domestic equity.  Nota-
bly, 26.9% of institutional assets are invested in passive index funds, and both actively managed 
and index institutional funds have the lowest average expense ratio of the three segments. 
We also include the institutional segment in the panel regressions of Table A2 that repli-
cates the regression of fund flow on past performance measures reported in Table 2.  The table 
also reports the coefficients on the control variables that were included but unreported in Table 2.  
In column (4) we find that fund flows in the institutional segment appear to behave similarly to 
broker-sold funds in that they are significantly related to lagged raw returns, and insignificantly 
related to risk-adjusted returns.  Like broker-sold funds, the coefficient on risk-adjusted returns is 
significantly different from the coefficient in the direct-sold segment (p-value of 0.029).  None of 
our earlier inferences on the broker-sold and direct-sold segments change. 
In Table A3, we report the results of regressions intended to match the specification re-
ported in Table 6 of Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009), where they test for differences 
in return chasing behavior across the broker-sold and direct-sold segments.  They regress flows 
in calendar year t on raw returns in calendar year t and calendar year t-1, and find that the sensi-
tivity of flows to raw returns is similar in both segments.  Their evidence is not directly compa-
rable to ours because they report results based on annual flows and do not include risk-adjusted 
performance measures in their regressions.  Specifications (2) and (4) are intended to match their 
specification as closely as possible, where they separately estimate flow sensitivity to positive 
performance.  When we control only for raw returns in specifications (1) and (2), we also find  
that the sensitivity of flows to raw returns is similar in the direct-sold and broker-sold segments.  
When we simultaneously control for raw returns and 4-factor alphas in specifications (3) and (4), 
however, we find that sensitivity of flows to 4-factor alphas is limited to the direct-sold segment.  
Note that while the estimated sensitivity of flows to alpha in the direct-sold segment tends to be 
higher than the estimated sensitivity of flows to raw returns in the broker-sold segment, we can-
not reject Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano’s finding that the overall tendency to chase past 
returns is at least as strong in the broker-sold segment.  This is because a one-standard deviation 
increase in 4-factor alpha (2.56%) is smaller than a one-standard deviation increase in raw re-
turns (5.61%).  
Table A4 replicates Table 3, except that we include institutional funds, and include in the 
regression a dummy variable equal to one if the fund is institutional.  The omitted dummy is the 
indicator variable for broker-sold funds.  We also report the coefficients on the control variables 
that were included but unreported in Table 3.  None of our inferences on the broker-sold and di-
rect-sold segments change.  Regarding the institutional segment, we find that active share is sig-
nificantly lower than in the broker-sold segment.  Both 4-factor alpha and active share are signif-
icantly higher in the direct-sold segment relative to the institutional segment (p-value = 0.00 in 
both cases), while return gap and 1-factor beta are not significantly different across the two seg-
ments. 
Table A5 replicates Table 3 Panels A and B, except that we restrict the sample to funds 
with a ticker, Morningstar rating (which ensures the fund is at least three years old), and Morn-
ingstar investment objective.  This filter eliminates 43.2% of our fund-month observations, pri-
marily because it limits our sample period to 1996-2002.  This specification is intended to show 
that our results are not driven by incubation bias (Evans (2010)).  The results are similar to those  
of Panels A and B of Table 3, with only a few exceptions.  In Panel B, within the sample of small 
cap funds, the difference in the 4-factor alphas of direct-sold and broker-sold funds increases 
from 17.4 to 22.5 basis points per month (p-value of 0.020), and the difference in return gaps in-
creases from 12.0 to 27.5 basis points per month (p-value of 0.000).  On the other hand, we do 
not find that the one-factor betas of direct-sold funds are significantly different from those of 
broker-sold funds.  This suggests that the tilt toward higher betas in the full sample might be 
driven by the incubation of broker-sold funds. 
Table A6 replicates Table 6, except that we report in column (4) the results of a regres-
sion where we restrict the sample to institutional funds.  We also report the coefficients on the 
control variables that are included, but not reported, in Table 6.  The dependent variable is fund 
i's four-factor alpha in month t, which we estimate using fund i’s after-fee returns over the prior 
24 months.  The independent variable of interest is a dummy variable indicating whether fund i 
is an index fund.  In column (4), we find that the estimated difference in performance for institu-
tional index funds is slightly smaller than in the full sample (5.5 basis points per month) but also 
statistically indistinguishable from zero (p-value of 0.263).  We note that the estimated differ-
ence in risk-adjusted after-fee returns is almost exactly equal to the 5.3 basis point difference in 
fees.  In the remaining columns (4) and (5) of Table 3, we pool all of the observations, but dis-
tinguish between actively and passively managed funds available in the three different market 
segments.   
Excluding fund-level control variables, the estimated coefficients on the five dummy var-
iables measure average risk-adjusted, after-fee performance relative to the average broker-sold 
actively managed fund (which is the omitted category).  In column (5), we see that the results on 
direct-sold actively managed funds relative to broker-sold funds are similar to those in Table 6.   
In column (5), the performance of direct-sold actively managed funds is statistically indistin-
guishable from the performance of the index funds available in all three segments.  In addition, 
while we estimate that broker-sold actively managed funds underperform institutional actively 
managed  funds  by  2.3  basis  points  per  month,  this  difference  is  not  significant  (p-value  of 
0.362).  In column (6), we include control variables and find that inferences do not change from 
Table 6. 
Table  A7  repeats  the  analysis  of  Table  6,  but  using  the  methodology  of  Fama  and 
MacBeth (1973), while Table A8 restricts the sample to funds with a ticker, Morningstar rating, 
and Morningstar investment objective.  In both tables, we find similar results to those in Table 6.  
In Table A7, the estimated underperformance of actively managed funds relative to index funds 
is 0.3 basis points per month in the direct-sold segment (p-value of 0.931) versus 10.1 basis 
points per month in the broker-sold segment (p-value of 0.011).  In Table A8, the estimated un-
derperformance of actively managed funds is 0.6 basis points per month in the direct-sold seg-
ment (p-value of 0.914) versus 11.0 basis points per month in the broker-sold segment (p-value 
of 0.064).  The one exception is in column (1) of Table A8, when we estimate a pooled regres-
sion  on.  the smaller sample of funds with a ticker and Morningstar data.  The estimated under-
performance of actively managed funds relative to index funds matches the estimate of 6.6 basis 




Appendix Table A1. Summary Statistics 
Panel A. Distribution of Domestic Equity Mutual Fund Assets across Three Market Segments (1992 and 2004) 
The table replicates the summary statistics in Panel A of Table 1, and adds statistics for the institutional market segment.  Panel below uses distribution channel 
data at the share class level from Financial Research Corporation (FRC) and data on TNA from the CRSP Survivor-bias-free Mutual Funds database in 1992 and 
2004.  The first three columns report aggregate total net assets (TNA) in domestic equity mutual fund share classes from three major fund market segments: di-
rect-sold, broker-sold, and institutional, with each segment divided into actively-managed funds and index funds. We exclude funds in CRSP that cannot be clas-
sified as direct-sold, broker-sold, or institutional, which collectively represent 7.8% of assets invested in domestic equity funds. We define domestic equity funds 
as those with a Standard and Poor’s investment objective of aggressive growth (AGG), mid-cap growth (GMC), growth and income (GRI), growth (GRO), in-
come and growth (ING), or small-cap growth (SCG). Market share within Segment is the percentage of aggregate TNA within the segment (direct-sold, broker-
sold, or institutional) that is actively-managed versus passively-managed, and should be read across the row.  For each fund family, we define a family’s primary 
segment as the segment with the largest percentage of family assets distributed through that segment. Number of Families is the number of families in the CRSP 
database that have at least one domestic equity mutual fund that are in that row’s primary segment. For example, in 1992, 97 families have the direct-sold chan-
nel as their primary segment because this is segment through which they distribute the most TNA. Average % TNA in Primary Segment is the average across 
families of the % of family TNA that is distributed through the family’s primary distribution segment. 
   
Aggregate TNA in  





within Segment   
 






  Active  Passive  Total    Active  Passive  Total     
1992                       
                        Direct-sold  $154.1  $8.4  $162.4    94.8%  5.2%  100%      97  98.1% 
                        Broker-sold  $148.4  $0.4  $148.8    99.7%  0.3%  100%      133  99.7% 
                        Institutional  $10.6  $3.9  $14.5    73.1%  26.9%  100%      26  98.9% 
                        Total  $313.0  $12.7  $325.7    96.1%  3.9%  100%      256   
                        2004                       
                        Direct-sold  $984.6  $189.6  $1,174.2    83.9%  16.1%  100%      192  96.5% 
                        Broker-sold  $779.0  $14.6  $793.7    98.2%  1.8%  100%      153  92.2% 
                        Institutional  $156.2  $75.0  $231.2    67.6%  32.4%  100%      78  82.8% 
                        Total  $1,919.8  $279.2  $2,199.0    87.3%  12.7%  100%      423   
                        
Appendix Table A1. Summary Statistics 
Panel B. Fund-level Summary Statistics for Domestic Equity Mutual Funds in Three Market Segments (1992-2004) 
The table replicates the summary statistics in Panel B of Table 1, and adds statistics for the institutional market segment.  This table provides the mean and stand-
ard deviation of fund-level variables from CRSP.  The unit of observation is domestic equity mutual fund i in month t.  The sample begins in January 1992 and 
ends in December 2004, and is restricted to those funds that distribute at least 75 percent of their assets through either the direct-sold, broker-sold, or institutional 
























Mean  Mean 
Std 
Dev  Mean 
Std 
Dev  Mean 
Std 
Dev  Mean 
Std 
Dev  Mean 
Std 
Dev 
                         
Actively Managed Funds                   
                        Direct-sold  440.2  1404.1  4923.9  1.29  0.74  0.09  0.17  139.3%  517.6%  0.92  5.92 
                        Broker-sold  615.7  839.5  3279.3  1.57  1.29  0.40  0.27  89.1%  80.2%  0.80  5.46 
                        Institutional  253.8  334.2  518.3  0.99  0.44  0.09  0.16  83.5%  67.2%  0.88  5.45 
                         
Index Funds                     
                        Direct-sold  26.3  3637.8  12211.6  0.44  0.36  0.02  0.07  25.0%  57.6%  0.78  5.02 
                        Broker-sold  16.5  353.0  514.7  0.86  0.45  0.31  0.29  24.4%  31.3%  0.64  4.82 
                        Institutional  26.2  1543.0  4628.8  0.37  0.17  0.07  0.15  24.7%  36.8%  0.80  4.61 
                                                
 
Appendix Table A2.  Monthly Flow-Performance Sensitivity Across Three Market Segments, Actively Managed funds (1993-
2004) 
These panels replicate panel regressions reported in Table 2, except that here we also report column (4) containing the results for the institutional market seg-
ment. In addition, here we report the coefficients on the fund-level control variables. In each column, the dependent variable is monthly net percentage fund flow, 
using the standard definition of flow, the growth in TNA less capital appreciation.  The unit of observation is actively managed domestic equity fund i in month t.  
The regression in column (1) contains investment objective-by-month fixed effects. The regressions in columns (2) through (4) include distribution market seg-
ment-by-investment objective-by-month fixed effects.  Panel B adds dummy variables that indicate whether fund i's net return in month t-1 was in either the top 
or bottom 20% of funds within the same Standard and Poor’s investment objective (but across segments), but otherwise is the same specification as Panel A. Ob-
servations where the absolute value of net flow is greater than 100% are deleted (less than 1% of the sample fit this definition.) Standard errors are clustered on 
both fund family and month and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Panel A. Base specification 
  (1)    (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable:  Net flow (t)    Net flow (t) 
Sample:  All segments    Direct-sold  Broker-sold  Institutional 
           












            Net return (t-1)   0.079
** 
(0.032) 






























            Lagged expense ratio   0.034 
(0.037) 






            Lagged 12b-1 fee  0.251 
(0.190) 






























            












            H0: Coefficient on lagged net flows is 
equal to Direct-sold segment 
   
 
0.460  0.527 
H0: Coefficient on lagged net return is 
equal to Direct-sold segment 








H0: Coefficient on 4-factor alpha is 
equal to Direct-sold segment 








            Include fund-level controls?  Yes      Yes   
Include fund-level controls by segment?  No      Yes   
Include Investment-objective-by-month 
fixed effects? 
Yes   
 
Yes   
Include Investment-objective-by-month-
by segment fixed effects? 
No   
 
Yes   
            Sample size  149,607      149,607   
R
2  0.0683      0.0853    
Panel B. Specification that allows for non-linearities 
 
  (1)    (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable:  Net flow (t)    Net flow (t) 
Sample:  All segments    Direct-sold  Broker-sold  Institutional 
           












            Net return (t-1)   0.028 
(0.039) 
























































            Lagged expense ratio   0.030 
(0.037) 






            Lagged 12b-1 fee  0.256 
(0.190) 










































            H0: Coefficient on lagged net flows is 
equal to Direct-sold segment 
   
 
0.448  0.543 
H0: Coefficient on lagged net return is 
equal to Direct-sold segment 








H0: Coefficient on Top 20% Dummy is 
equal to Direct-sold segment 








H0: Coefficient on Bottom 20% dummy 
is equal to Direct-sold segment 








H0: Coefficient on 4-factor alpha is 
equal to Direct-sold segment 








            Include fund-level controls?  Yes      Yes   
Include fund-level controls by segment?  No      Yes   
Include Investment-objective-by-month 
fixed effects? 
Yes   
 
Yes   
Include Investment-objective-by-month-
by segment fixed effects? 
No   
 
Yes   
            Sample size  149,607      149,607   
R
2  0.0691      0.0863    
Appendix Table A3. Monthly flow-performance sensitivity using specification in Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) 
This table reports panel regressions where the dependent variable is monthly net percentage fund flow, using the standard definition of flow, the growth in TNA 
less capital appreciation.  The unit of observation is actively managed fund i in month t.  All regressions include the following fund-level control variables inter-
acted with market segment fixed effects, the coefficients of which are not reported: lagged expense ratio, lagged no-load fund dummy, lagged 12b-1 fee, lagged 
log of fund TNA, lagged log of family TNA, and current fund age measured in years. All regressions also include market segment-by-investment objective-by-
month fixed effects. The specification is intended to match Table 6 of BCT, except that we use monthly flow instead of annual flow, and we exclude index funds. 
Standard errors are clustered on both fund family and month and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
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                        4-factor Alpha (t-1) 
   
 











                        4-factor Alpha (t-1) *  
     4-factor Alpha (t-1) > 0?     
 
   
 
   




                        H0: Coefficients on lagged net 



















H0: Coefficients on positive 
lagged net return equal across 
segments?   
   
 
0.690   
 





H0: Coefficients on 4-factor alpha 
equal across segments?   
   
 










H0: Coefficients on positive 4-
factor alpha equal across seg-
ments?   
   
 
   
 





Sample size    126,537      126,537      126,537      126,537 
R
2    0.0870      0.0874      0.0885      0.0888 
Appendix Table A4. Monthly Fund Performance of Actively Managed Funds Across Three Market Segments (1993-2004)  
The table below replicates the panel regressions in Panel A of Table 3, except that the sample below also includes funds in the institutional market segment, and 
the regressions include a dummy variable indicating an institutional fund.  We also report coefficients on the control variables that were not reported in Table 3.  
The sample is restricted to non-specialty actively managed domestic equity funds operating between January 1993 and December 2004 for which we possess 
fund-level distribution channel data from FRC.  The performance measure in column (1) is fund i’s four-factor alpha estimated from net returns over the prior 24 
months, while in column (2) it is fund i’s return gap measure (i.e., the difference between fund i’s gross returns and the gross returns predicted based on its 
lagged holdings, as calculated in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008)).  The dependent variable in column (3) identifies those funds with above-median values 
of active share and tracking error as calculated in Cremers and Petajisto (2009), where we allow the median value to vary across investment objective-year pairs. 
The fact that data on active share and tracking error are only available in those months that mutual funds disclose their holdings explains the smaller number of 
observations in column (3).  In column (4), we measure a fund’s 1-factor beta as the beta on the market portfolio in the one-factor model. All regressions include 
investment objective-by-month fixed effects. The distribution segment dummy variables are equal to one if 75 percent or more of fund i’s TNA is distributed 
through that segment. Standard errors are clustered on both fund family and month, and are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Panel A. All Actively Managed Domestic Equity funds 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 












Values of  








       

























































































          
























         
























          Investment Objective-by-Month  
fixed effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
          Fund-level control variables?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
          Sample size  144,896  115,675  26,648  144,896 
          R
2  0.1246  0.0240  0.1387  0.1431 






Appendix Table A5. Monthly Fund Performance Across Market Segments (using subsample of funds with ticker, Morningstar 
rating, and Morningstar investment objectives) (1996-2002) 
The table below replicates the panel regressions in Panel A of Table 3, except that in the sample below we require funds to have a ticker, Morningstar rating, and 
Morningstar investment objective.  Panel B further restricts the sample to actively managed small-cap growth funds, but is otherwise identical to Panel A. Data 
availability for the Morningstar rating and investment objectives restricts the sample in both panels to the 1996 to 2002 period. The table below reports coeffi-
cients from panel regressions of fund i’s monthly performance on fund and family characteristics.  The performance measure in column (1) is fund i’s four-factor 
alpha estimated from net returns over the prior 24 months, while in column (2) it is fund i’s return gap measure (i.e., the difference between fund i’s gross returns 
and the gross returns predicted based on its lagged holdings, as calculated in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008)).  The dependent variable in column (3) iden-
tifies those funds with above-median values of active share and tracking error as calculated in Cremers and Petajisto (2009), where we allow the median value to 
vary across investment objective-year pairs. The fact that data on active share and tracking error are only available in those months that mutual funds disclose 
their holdings explains the smaller number of observations in column (3).  In column (4), we measure a fund’s 1-factor beta as the beta on the market portfolio in 
the one-factor model. All regressions include investment objective-by-month fixed effects.  The direct-sold segment dummy variable is equal to one if 75 percent 
or more of fund i’s TNA is distributed through the direct-sold segment.  Standard errors are clustered on both fund family and month, and are reported in paren-
theses.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Panel A. All Actively Managed Domestic Equity funds 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
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          Investment Objective-by-Month  
fixed effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
          Fund-level control variables?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
          Sample size  67,375  60,261  12,248  67,375 
          R
2  0.2021  0.0458  0.1940  0.4505 
 
Panel B. Sample Restricted to Actively Managed Small-Cap Growth Funds 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 












Values of  








       




































































































         























          Investment Objective-by-Month  
fixed effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
          Fund-level control variables?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
          Sample size  14,800  13,490  2,792  14,800 
          R
2  0.1921  0.0477  0.2376  0.553  
Appendix Table A6. Monthly Fund 4-Factor Alphas of Actively Managed and Index Funds Across Three Market Segments 
(1993-2004) 
The table below replicates the regressions in Table 6, except that columns (4) through (6) reports results from a sample that also includes funds in the institutional 
market segment.  We also report coefficients on the control variables that were not reported in Table 6. The table below reports coefficients from panel regres-
sions of fund i’s monthly 4-factor alpha on fund and family characteristics in a sample of domestic equity funds operating between January 1993 and December 
2004 for which we possess distribution channel data from FRC.  Fund i’s four-factor alpha is estimated from net returns over the prior 24 months.  The Index 
fund dummy variable equals one if fund i is passively managed, and the Active dummy variables equal one if fund i is actively managed. The Direct-sold dummy 
variable equals one if 75 percent or more of fund i’s TNA is distributed through the direct-sold channel.  The Broker-sold dummy variable equals one if 75 per-
cent or more of fund i’s TNA is distributed through the Broker-sold channel. The Institutional dummy variable equals one if 75 percent or more of fund i’s TNA 
is distributed through institutional channel. Column (1) contains all funds, while columns (2), (3), and (4) are restricted to funds in the direct-sold, broker-sold, 
and institutional segments respectively.  Columns (5) and (6) include funds from all segments.  All regressions include CRSP Standard and Poor’s investment 
category-by-month fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered on both month and family and are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
              Dependent variable:             
  4-Factor Alpha (t) 
  All segments  Direct-sold  Broker-sold  Institutional  All  All 
Index fund dummy (t)  0.073
** 
(0.037)   
       
              Active fund dummy (t)  Omitted 
category   
       
              Direct-sold dummy (t) *  










              Direct-sold dummy (t) *  
Active fund (t)   
Omitted 







              Broker-sold dummy (t) *  









              Broker-sold dummy (t)) *  
Active fund (t)     
Omitted 





              Institutional dummy (t)) *  










              Institutional dummy (t)) *  







              Lagged expense ratio 




              No-load fund? 




              Lagged 12b-1 fee 
         
  0.043 
(0.072) 
              Lagged Ln Fund TNA 




              Lagged Ln Family TNA 
           
0.009 
(0.007) 
              Lagged Portfolio Turnover 




              Fund Age in Years 




              Lagged Net Flow 




              Lagged Standard Deviation of Net 
Flow 




              Investment objective*Month fixed 
effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
Sample size  151,674  51,469  71,364  28,841  151,674  151,674 
              R
2  0.1241  0.0973  0.1458  0.2304  0.1244  0.1257 
                
Appendix Table A7. Monthly Fund 4-Factor Alphas of Actively Managed and Index Funds Across Market Segments (1993-
2004): Fama MacBeth Regressions 
The table below reports the results of monthly Fama MacBeth regressions instead of the panel regressions of Table 6. The reported coefficients and R
2 are the 
average coefficients and R
2 across 143 months. Fund i’s four-factor alpha is estimated from net returns over the prior 24 months.  The Index fund dummy varia-
ble equals one if fund i is passively managed, and the Active dummy variables equal one if fund i is actively managed. The Direct-sold dummy variable equals 
one if 75 percent or more of fund i’s TNA is distributed through the direct-sold channel.  The Broker-sold dummy variable equals one if 75 percent or more of 
fund i’s TNA is distributed through the Broker-sold channel. Column (1) contains all retail funds, while columns (2) and (3) are restricted to funds in the direct-
sold or broker-sold segments.  Columns (4) and (5) include funds from both segments.  All regressions include CRSP Standard and Poor’s investment category-
by-month fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered on both month and family and are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Dependent variable: 
Sample:  Both segments  Direct-sold  Broker-sold  Both segments 
            Index fund dummy (t)  0.066
* 
(0.034)   
     
            Active fund dummy (t)  Omitted 
category   
     
            Direct-sold dummy (t) *  










            Direct-sold dummy (t) *  
Active fund (t)   
Omitted 







            Broker-sold dummy (t) *  









            Broker-sold dummy (t)) *  







            Lagged expense ratio 
   
    -0.146
*** 
(0.042) 
            No-load fund?     
    -0.039 
(0.024) 
            Lagged 12b-1 fee 
     
    0.103
 
(0.065) 
            
Lagged Ln Fund TNA 




            Lagged Ln Family TNA 
     
    0.009 
(0.006) 
            Lagged Portfolio Turnover 
        0.000 
(0.000) 
            Fund Age in Years 




            Lagged Net Flow 
   
    0.001
*** 
(0.000) 
            Lagged Standard Deviation of Net 
Flow 
     
 
  -0.011 
(0.011) 
            Investment objective*Month fixed 
effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
            Sample size  122,833  51,469  71,364  122,833  122,833 
            R
2  0.0001  0.0003  0.0001  0.0005  0.0021 
  
Appendix Table A8. Monthly Fund 4-Factor Alphas of Actively Managed and Index Funds Across Market Segments (using 
subsample of funds with ticker, Morningstar rating, and Morningstar investment objectives) (1996-2002) 
The table below replicates the panel regressions of Table 6, except that in the sample below we require funds to have a ticker, Morningstar rating, and Morn-
ingstar investment objective.  Data availability for the Morningstar rating and investment objectives restricts the sample to the 1996 to 2002 period. Fund i’s four-
factor alpha is estimated from net returns over the prior 24 months.  The Index fund dummy variable equals one if fund i is passively managed, and the Active 
dummy variables equal one if fund i is actively managed. The Direct-sold dummy variable equals one if 75 percent or more of fund i’s TNA is distributed 
through the direct-sold channel.  The Broker-sold dummy variable equals one if 75 percent or more of fund i’s TNA is distributed through the Broker-sold chan-
nel. Column (1) contains all retail funds, while columns (2) and (3) are restricted to funds in the direct-sold or broker-sold segments.  Columns (4) and (5) in-
clude funds from both segments.  All regressions include CRSP Standard and Poor’s investment category-by-month fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered 
on both month and family and are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Dependent variable: 
Sample:  Both segments  Direct-sold  Broker-sold  Both segments 
            Index fund dummy (t)  0.066
 
(0.046)   
     
            Active fund dummy (t)  Omitted 
category   
     
            Direct-sold dummy (t) *  










            Direct-sold dummy (t) *  
Active fund (t)   
Omitted 







            Broker-sold dummy (t) *  









            Broker-sold dummy (t)) *  







            Lagged expense ratio 
   
    -0.086
*** 
(0.025) 
            No-load fund?     
    -0.007 
(0.043) 
            Lagged 12b-1 fee 
     
    0.046
 
(0.091)  
            Lagged Ln Fund TNA 




            Lagged Ln Family TNA 
     
    0.013 
(0.009) 
            Lagged Portfolio Turnover 
        0.000
* 
(0.000) 
            Fund Age in Years 
       
  -0.002 
(0.001) 
            Lagged Net Flow 
   
    0.002
*** 
(0.001) 
            Lagged Standard Deviation of Net 
Flow 
     
 
  -0.024 
(0.014) 
            Investment objective*Month fixed 
effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
            Sample size  69,573  31,169  38,404  69,573  69,573 
            R
2  0.2005  0.1925  0.2307  0.2006  0.2020 
 
 